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THESIS

BREAKING TERRORISTS' WILL TO FIGHT

by

Paulo E. Santa Barba

June 2014

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Heather S. Gregg
Frank R. Giordano

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BREAKING TERRORISTS' WILL TO FIGHT

Paulo E. Santa Barba
Lieutenant Colonel, Brazilian Army
B.S., Brazilian Army Military Academy, 1993

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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June 2014**

Author: Paulo E. Santa Barba

Approved by: Heather S. Gregg, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

Frank R. Giordano, Ph.D.
Second Reader

John Arquilla, Ph.D.
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines which variables give terrorists their will to fight in order to determine if such motivations can be eroded through a counterterrorist campaign. Drawing from the expansive literature on the causes of terrorism, and using Bertalanffy's theory of open systems, the study posits that the will to fight is a function of the following variables: a belief in a cause, a desire for revenge, a search for satisfaction (reputation, joy, and money), and cultural attributes.

The thesis tests these variables through the use of a longitudinal case study of the rise and fall of the Sendero Luminoso—Shining Path—and its will to fight. It finds that religious beliefs and desire for revenge were particularly important in this case. Building on these findings, this thesis recommends specific strategies that aim to undermine terrorists' will to fight by identifying the key variables and their level of influence on terrorists' will to fight: making all instruments of statecraft work in unison; adapting to the situation on an ongoing basis; being consistent; and not overreacting.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

COIN	counterinsurgency
CVR	<i>Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación</i> (Truth and Reconciliation Commission)
DINCOTE	<i>Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo</i> (National Direction against Terrorism)
ETA	<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i> (Basque Homeland and Freedom)
FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FLN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> (National Liberation Front)
IED	improvised explosive device
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i> (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
VRAEM	<i>Valle del Río Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro</i> (Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley)

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I. INTRODUCTION

Why repeat the old errors, if there are so many new errors
to commit?

—Bertrand Russell

There are only a few topics in security studies that have been as thoroughly studied as terrorism. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the available literature focuses on the symptoms of the problem, not on its causes. Moreover, most militaries still have a classical war mindset—focusing on destroying the enemy—an approach that has shown itself ineffective against terrorism. This thesis will hypothesize that it is not only necessary to manipulate the means available to the terrorists, but also the conditions that may influence their will to fight.

A. BACKGROUND

According to the U.S. Department of State, there are more than 50 significant terrorist organizations active around the world.¹ These groups pose a threat not only to the countries they claim to be fighting, but to any country that has people or assets related to the countries they target, particularly the ones that are responsible for holding international meetings or competitions.² For instance, the Black September terrorist attack in Munich during the 1972 Olympics—in which 11 Israeli athletes were kidnapped and murdered—is unforgettable and demonstrates that terrorists can attack virtually anywhere in the world. Globalization has led to porous borders and ease of travel has shortened the distances among states; technology, in turn, has facilitated terrorist operations by providing, for instance, easy, fast, and cheap means of communication, transportation, and financing. All of these factors have made preventing and fighting terrorism a top security concern.

¹ U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” September 28, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

² Brazil will hold the World Cup this year and the Olympics in 2016.

Most countries that have faced terrorism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries react fiercely against it, particularly following deadly attacks. For instance, the U.S. reaction to the September 11 attacks was to declare a Global War on Terror. “The Bush administration focused on dealing with the military capabilities of terrorist organizations while attacking their installations, bases, financing sources and the operatives, as well as attacking the regimes providing shelter and support to terrorist organizations.”³

However, after almost 12 years of fighting and the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda is still operational. According to the British Secretary of State for the Home Department, “Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat from Al Qaeda inspired terrorism is not.”⁴ More recently, on August 4, 2013, the U.S. Government announced the closure of 25 embassies and consulates in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Judging by the actions that were taken, Al-Qaeda’s capabilities are still considered hazardous as stated by Mike Rogers, the intelligence committee chairman: “The seriousness of the threat stream is a sober reminder of al Qaeda’s determination and ongoing intention to commit acts of violence on Western and U.S. targets.”⁵

This traditional strategy has prioritized the use of force to deal with terrorism. The problem with this approach is that the military machine understands that the best way to solve the problem is by destroying the enemy’s forces and, since the enemy is a non-state actor, this will be accomplished by decapitation of the leadership—in the case of important key leaders—or by targeting the terrorists’ organizations or networks. The logic behind this strategy is that killing terrorist leaders and destroying their networks will stop terrorist attacks. However, such an approach will not be effective if the terrorists’ rate of recruitment is higher than the military ability to eliminate terrorists. And

³ Boaz Ganor, “The U.S. Counterterrorism Policy – The Calm before the Storm,” *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, September 11, 2011, <http://www.ict.org.il/NewsCommentaries/Commentaries/tabid/69/Articleid/982/currentpage/8/Default.aspx>.

⁴ United Kingdom, HM Government, *Prevent Strategy* (Norwich, UK: TSO, June 2011).

⁵ Tony Capra, Andrea Mitchell, and Catherine Chomiak, “Al Qaeda Threat is ‘Real and Serious’ – Intelligence Committee Chief,” *NBC News*, August 3, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/03/19844862-al-qaeda-threat-is-real-and-serious-intelligence-committee-chief?lite.

as some excesses are made by the state, new grievances arise and the problem never ceases. The terrorists' will to fight in such cases may even grow stronger. Tore Bjørge argues that this "one-sided focus on military means and repressive responses may become a greater threat to civil society."⁶

In June 2011, the United States announced a shift in its approach from one of leadership targeting to a new strategy "to diminish specific drivers and grievances."⁷ In practice, however, it has been quite difficult to identify this change. Ben Bordurian argues, "The Obama administration, while stressing the importance of democracy and human rights, *generally avoids theoretical discussions of the root drivers of terrorism* [emphasis added]. Instead, the 2011 document largely focuses on what the government and its international partners are doing operationally to combat al Qaeda's central apparatus in South Asia, its regional affiliates in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, and its followers across the world, including in the United States and Europe."⁸ The problem is that the root drivers may also provide terrorists with the will to fight; if they are misidentified and different variables are targeted, a state's counterterrorism strategy will not be effective. In fact, it could lead to increasing the terrorists' will to fight.

Carl von Clausewitz states that to defeat your adversary "you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, *the total means at his disposal* and *the strength of his will*."⁹ Building on such observation, this thesis hypothesizes that terrorists' power of resistance (T) is given by the equation $T = mw$, where (m) represents the terrorists' resources and (w) is the strength of their will to fight. If this globalized world has made it even more difficult to intercept all the resources available for terrorists (m), a better strategy may be achieved

⁶ Tore Bjørge, ed., preface to *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (New York: Routledge, 2005), xvii.

⁷ Barack Obama, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: White House, June 2011), 10.

⁸ Ben Bodurian, "The New National Strategy for Counterterrorism," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 30, 2011, <http://csis.org/publication/new-national-strategy-counterterrorism>.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 16.

by manipulating (w).¹⁰ The result of a small amount of means times a weak will to fight should be a reduction of terrorism activities. According to Martha Crenshaw, these variables may be identifiable: “If there are consistent patterns in terrorist behavior, rather than random idiosyncrasies, a strategic analysis may reveal them. Prediction of future terrorism can only be based on theories that explain past patterns.”¹¹

B. PURPOSE

Clausewitz was not the only one to acknowledge the importance of the will to fight in a battle. According to Napoleon, “the moral is to the physical as three to one.”¹² Mao stated that his forces “absolutely must not relax in the least their will to fight; any thinking that relaxes the will to fight and belittles the enemy is wrong.”¹³ RAND researchers also recognize the importance of the will to fight in insurgency campaigns. Their studies demonstrated that if a counterinsurgency force does not have the will to win the conflict, they will eventually lose, even if they are sponsored by powerful forces with a strong will. In other words: if they do not want to win, one cannot win for them.¹⁴

These observations highlight the great significance of the human will in a contest. Terrorism is a strategy used by the weak to fight the strong. Non-state terrorists fight from an inferior position in respect to the state; nevertheless, there are dozens of active terrorist groups throughout the world. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that in order to continue fighting against these odds, terrorists must have a strong will to balance the equation.

¹⁰ The equation uses Clausewitz’s assertion that the enemy power of resistance is expressed by the product of the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will. Clausewitz, *On War*, 16.

¹¹ Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 24.

¹² B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 25.

¹³ Mao Tse-Tung and Zedong Mao, “Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, March 5, 1949” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. IV (San Francisco: China Books, 1972), 361.

¹⁴ Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2013), xxix.

Furthermore, terrorists design their actions with the purpose of breaking their adversary's will to fight: “. . . insurgents engaged in urban violence all pursue the intermediate aim of eroding the government's will to resist.”¹⁵ This is a logical and mandatory adaptation to the environment they face; terrorists either pursue such a goal or vanish, because this is their best chance of winning. The question then becomes: How can states effectively reduce (w) to truly insignificant values? Here lies the purpose of this thesis: to study what translates grievances into the will to conduct terrorism and, in turn, how to counter those variables with an effective strategy that breaks the will of terrorists.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The objective of this thesis is to answer these questions: *What gives terrorists the will to fight? Can this will be eroded, and will this result in a reduction of terrorism?*

The following nested questions will be used to assist in responding to the primary research questions:

1. What is the traditional strategy used against terrorism? Does it work? If not, what points are missing or what are its problems?
2. Under what conditions do terrorists acquire their will to fight? What is the relationship between grievances and the will to fight? If grievances are minimized or removed, will terrorist actions decline, suggesting a weakening of their will?
3. Is there a threshold for grievances that needs to be exceeded in order to trigger terrorist actions or instill in them the will to fight?
4. What would a good approach for reducing terrorism look like?

¹⁵ Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990), 46.

D. HYPOTHESIS AND THESIS SCOPE

Based on the background of the subject and the research questions, this thesis intends to examine the validity of the following propositions:

1. Grievances have a direct relationship with terrorists' will to fight.
2. Breaking the terrorists' will to fight will mitigate terrorism.
3. A more holistic approach designed to reduce not only (*m*) but also (*w*) is likely to work better in the long run than an approach which primarily targets (*m*) by the use of military and repressive means.

The scope of this thesis will consider only terrorist actions perpetrated by non-state actors against states. Terrorism used by criminal organizations that do not aim to “see the formal state disappear,”¹⁶ but “to maintain equilibrium between the public or institutional state and the privatized interests of the mafia state”¹⁷ are therefore beyond the scope of the thesis. The analysis will be conducted at the leadership and group levels. Finally, the timeframe of this study will be limited to the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

E. METHODOLOGY

First, this thesis will use qualitative methods in order to investigate the conditions and variables that give terrorists the will to fight. This thesis will also draw on Bertalanffy's theory of open systems to propose a theory of the conditions under which terrorists lose their will to fight.

Second, the thesis will process-trace one longitudinal case study—the Shining Path—in order to test this theory and the variables that affected the rise and fall of the Shining Path's popularity and will to fight in Peru. Although it is quite difficult to measure human behavior, it is possible to identify and analyze the factors that have some influence on the study variable; this is the aim of this thesis using the wealth of primary and secondary data available on this group.

¹⁶ Alison Jamieson, “The Use of Terrorism by Organized Crime,” in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed. Tore Bjørgo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 165.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Third, this thesis will build on its case-study process tracing to propose a list of tactics and operations that ought to be present in a counterterrorism strategy that aims to undermine the will of terrorists to fight.

F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study suggests that the will to fight is a function of a belief in a cause, be it a religion, an ideology, ethnicity, or values; a desire for revenge; a search for satisfaction (renown, joy, or financial incentives), and cultural traits. The investigation finds that religious beliefs and desire for revenge were the most influential variables in the case of Sendero Luminoso and that the will to fight may significantly change over time.

The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II presents a brief history of terrorism, defines the term as it shall be understood in this thesis, and depicts terrorism with the lens under which it will be analyzed. In Chapter III the will to fight is defined, its importance in terrorism is highlighted, the variables that generate it are identified, and a model that correlates the variables of the will to fight with terrorism is offered. Chapter IV provides a case study of Sendero Luminoso's will to fight based on the model proposed on the previous chapter. The final chapter displays the conclusions found and offers recommendations for reducing terrorists' will to fight.

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II. TERRORISM

Pinpointing the causes of terrorism throughout history is a very controversial undertaking. Moreover, the term itself has more than 200 definitions.¹⁸ Therefore, it is important to provide a history on the subject to present certain definitions used by some respected scholars, to define the term as it shall be understood in this thesis, and to depict terrorism with the lens under which it will be analyzed.

A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW ON THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is not a problem known only to our times; in fact, it is a recurrent problem that can be traced back for millennia. Furthermore, the establishment of a starting point for terrorism depends on how the word is understood as well as on the existence of written accounts that support it. If one assumes that the objective of terrorism is to spread fear by intentionally attacking noncombatants in order to influence behavior, then Caleb Carr argues that the Romans are to be considered the first ones to employ the strategy systematically.¹⁹

The complete destruction of Carthage by Rome in 146 BC led to “the utter eradication not only of the enemy’s home but of many if not most of his people as well: men, women, children, even the elderly,”²⁰ in order to serve as an example to other peoples of the possible consequences of not complying with Roman policies. Another example is the crucifixion of about 6,000 of Spartacus’ companions along the Appian Way’s route from Capua to Rome in 71 BC.²¹ In both cases, terror was spread from above: it was employed by the Empire against the weak.

¹⁸ Bjørge, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism*, 1.

¹⁹ Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare against Civilians* (New York: Random House, 2003), 17.

²⁰ Ibid., 18.

²¹ Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2010), 23.

Nevertheless, most scholars point out that terrorism arose in the first century AD, when the Zealots used the *sica*—a short sword or a large dagger—to spread fear among Roman occupiers in Palestine. They were a group of Judean extremists who believed “that they had to account to God alone”²² and whose targets were not only Roman citizens, but any supporter of the occupiers. Louise Richardson notes that their “preferred tactic was to mingle in the crowds at a festival or other large gathering, locate their opponent, pull a concealed dagger from beneath their clothes, stab their victim, and then disappear back into the crowd.”²³

About a thousand years later, the Assassins became known for spreading terror throughout the Middle East. Rooted in Iran and Syria, they were a Shia Muslim sect whose objective was to “reconstitute Islam as a single religious entity”²⁴ and whose targets were Muslim elites and Westerners (mainly Crusaders).²⁵ They habitually infiltrated towns or villages and, over time, established personal connections with their targets so they could either stab them in public²⁶ or blackmail their victims. In these two cases, terrorism was indeed a strategy used by the weak against the strong.

Despite these historic examples, the term terrorism was established only in 1793 by Edmund Burke²⁷ to describe what Robespierre inaugurated as the *Régime de la Terreur* (Reign of Terror): “Subdue by terror the enemies of liberty, and you will be right, as founders of the Republic.”²⁸ The Committee of Public Safety, controlled by the Jacobins, used the power of the state to send to the guillotine anyone the Revolutionary Tribunal found guilty of being against the new ideas introduced by the French Revolution. Their intention was clear: “It is necessary that the terror caused by the

²² Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda* (University of California Press, 2007), 56.

²³ Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2007), 24.

²⁴ Ibid., 26.

²⁵ Chaliand and Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism*, 66–73.

²⁶ Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, 26.

²⁷ Martin, *Understanding Terrorism*, 24.

²⁸ Maximilien Robespierre, “Justification of the Use of Terror,” in *Terrorism: Primary Sources* (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2009), 47–54.

guillotine spreads in all of France and brings to justice all the traitors. There is no other means to inspire the necessary terror which will consolidate the Revolution.”²⁹

Key technological developments from the Industrial Revolution, particularly in communications, transportation, and chemistry (mainly the invention of dynamite) combined with the emergence of a new capitalist order strongly influenced what is currently labeled modern terrorism. It started in the late nineteenth century and continues today. For David C. Rapoport, this period can be described according to four distinct waves: the anarchist or first wave, in his view, started in Russia in the 1880s “with the assassination campaigns of prominent officials;”³⁰ the second wave—anticolonial—started in the 1920s and ended in the 1960s; the third wave became known as the new left wave, which is still present in some places and focuses on Marxist/Leninist and separatist movements; and the religious wave, which started in 1979.³¹

Modern terrorism is the focus of this research because it is the form of violence we are confronted with today. Furthermore, in the modern era, terrorism has spread to different places of the world, making it an international matter: “similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationships.”³²

B. DEFINING TERRORISM

The *2011 Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* provides 261 definitions of terrorism. How can such a term have so many different interpretations? Bjørge argues that this is because it “is an extremely complex set of phenomena, covering a great diversity of groups with different origins and causes.”³³ Another important reason is that each stakeholder tries to delineate the term according to his own “priorities and particular

²⁹ Alex P. Schmid, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 41.

³⁰ David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, eds. Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 47.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Bjørge, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism*, 1.

interests.”³⁴ Depending on who is providing the definition, terrorism can be a good or a bad thing. According to Carlos Marighella:

A violence or terrorism accusation at the outset has a bad meaning. It has acquired a new drapery, a new color. It doesn't divide, it doesn't discredit; it represents the center of the attraction. Today, *to be considered “violent” or “terrorist” is a quality that ennobles any honored person*, [emphasis added] because it is a worthy act of a revolutionary who is engaged in the armed struggle against the shameless military dictatorship and its atrocities.³⁵

In the words of Robespierre, “Terror is nothing else than immediate justice, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an *outflow of virtue*, it is not so much a specific principle than a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to the most pressing needs of the motherland.”³⁶ For the twentieth century Narodnaya Volya argues, “Terroristic activity consists of the *destruction of the most harmful persons in the government*, [emphasis added] the protection of the Party from spies, and the punishment of official lawlessness and violence in all the more prominent and important cases where it is manifested.”³⁷ It is clear that all of these writers agree that the means justify the ends and that their assessments are the correct ones.

Most countries also have their own definitions, which sometimes differ among their ministries, agencies, and departments. Gus Martin states that an American definition of the term, combining the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Code, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and State Department definitions, should look something like this:

Terrorism is a premeditated and unlawful act in which groups or agents of some principal engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence against human or property targets. These groups or agents engage in this behavior intending the purposeful intimidation of governments or people to affect policy or behavior with an underlying political objective.³⁸

³⁴ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 31.

³⁵ Carlos Marighella, *Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, 1969, trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba. <http://www.anarquismo.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/carlos-marighella-manual-do-guerrilheiro-urbano.pdf>.

³⁶ Schmid, *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, 99.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Martin, *Understanding Terrorism*, 43–4.

For the Brazilian Armed Forces, terrorism is:

A form of action that involves the use of physical or psychological violence, in a premeditated way, by individuals or groups that may or may not be sponsored by States, in order to coerce a government, an authority, an individual, a group, or even an entire population to adopt a desired behavior. It is motivated and organized by political, ideological, economic, environmental, religious or psychosocial reasons.³⁹

According to Richardson, “Terrorists are substate actors who violently target noncombatants to communicate a political message to a third party.”⁴⁰ Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism “as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence.”⁴¹ Boaz Ganor maintains that “[t]errorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious, etc.).”⁴² Schmid provides a revised academic consensus definition of the term as:

*Terrorism refers on the one hand to a **doctrine** about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial **practice** of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and noncombatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.*⁴³

In this thesis, terrorism shall be understood as **a strategy used by non-state actors that involves the threat or the use of premeditated violence against civilians to communicate a message to a government in order to achieve a political goal. The term civilian, in this case, does not encompass government officials whose exercise of authority has direct relationship to the use or the capability to demand the use of**

³⁹ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Glossário das Forças Armadas*, MD35-G-01, trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba (Brasília, DF: 2007), 253.

⁴⁰ Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, 20.

⁴¹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 40.

⁴² Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: a Guide for Decision Makers* (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 2008), 17.

⁴³ Schmid, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, 86.

force.⁴⁴ This definition includes the three elements that are used by most scholars: violence, civilians, and political message.

Another unique aspect of terrorism “is its ability to directly compromise one’s sense of personal security.”⁴⁵ The individuals excluded from the aforementioned definition, although they are civilians, are the ones in charge of the decision for the employment of force; so, an action against them may be understood as an effort to interfere with the decision-making process that has no direct intention of delivering a political message. In other words, if the population is not targeted, but only the military or government officials, it is not an act of terrorism; it is a different type of crime. In this case, as Ganor implies, there is no intention of changing the assessments and principles of the persons of a society—who are concerned about their welfare caused by the sense of insecurity—in order to make them pressure the government to react as the terrorists want. Finally, the main difficulty of not having a consensual definition of terrorism is that it makes it difficult to achieve international cooperation,⁴⁶ a crucial point in the fight against terrorist organizations or networks. The United Nations, for instance, has not reached a consensual definition of the term yet.

Modern terrorism, which does not respect borders, makes use of globalization, state failure, and technology to spread the problem throughout the globe. In our time, any nation can fall victim to terrorism, as possible designated targets can be located within its borders, even if the terrorist action is not intended to affect the population of the country where it is committed. More important is to keep in mind that “terrorism, however defined, has always challenged the stability of societies and the peace of mind of everyday people.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ For instance, an attack against the Secretary of Defense is not considered a terrorist action, as long as it does not harm civilians. The same applies for an attack conducted against military installations. Nevertheless, if a civilian is gravely hurt, the act is automatically defined as terrorism; no “collateral damages” are excused.

⁴⁵ Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*, 255.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁷ Martin, *Understanding Terrorism*, 3.

C. SUBCATEGORIES OF TERRORISM

The vast literature on terrorism provides many different classifications of the subject. Ganor, for instance, provides a model based on religious, separatist, anarchist, freedom fighter, and revolutionary typologies.⁴⁸ Hoffman talks about separatist, international, state-sponsored, and religious terrorism.⁴⁹ Martin divides it into state, dissident, religious, criminal, and international terrorism.⁵⁰ There are also many other classifications based on targets, location, psychology, tactics, structure, size, financing, and goals of the terrorists.

As terrorism is an intricate and multidisciplinary subject, all previously mentioned divisions are useful if they provide information about the characteristics and peculiarities of terrorists that can be used by academics and operators to understand and counter the problem. Drawing on the existing literature, this thesis proposes a broader classification that focuses on the political goals of the terrorists, followed by the motivation behind them. For that reason, at the highest level, terrorism can be characterized as revolutionary, secessionist, or resistant (see Figure 1 at the end of this section). One level down, these categories further subdivide into religious, ideological, or ethnic. This division is important for the next chapter, as it will have different implications on the narratives used by the groups and consequently on the terrorists' will to fight.

Revolutionaries' ultimate goals are to create new political orders. They can be religiously or ideologically motivated. For instance, Al-Qaeda's goal is "to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems 'non-Islamic' and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries"⁵¹ and its motivation relates to cosmic war, as its members believe they are fighting a metaphysical battle between good and evil that is happening now and in this world. Sendero Luminoso—Shining Path—and FARC

⁴⁸ Boaz Ganor, "Terrorist Organization Typologies and the Probability of a Boomerang Effect," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31, no. 4 (2008), 272.

⁴⁹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.

⁵⁰ Martin, *Understanding Terrorism*, 46.

⁵¹ Global Security, "Al-Qaida/Al-Qaeda (The Base)," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm>.

(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) are examples of Marxist ideological groups; they seek to create Marxist regimes based on a dogmatic platform of agrarian-socialism and anti-imperialism.⁵²

Secessionists aim to establish a new political community by separating from the state they are affiliated with and creating a new autonomous region or state that is self-governed. Ethnic differences are the main reason for their acts. The IRA—Irish Republican Army—the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Freedom), and the PKK—Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers' Party—are some examples of ethnic groups that seek political and/or territorial autonomy from the states in which they reside. At this point, it is important to note that some groups may have more than one motivation. For instance, ethnicity and religion can exist at the same time, as in the case of the IRA, but political motivation and the desire for autonomy from Britain is the central reason for their actions and supersedes religious motivations such as the creation of a theocracy.

The major goal of resistance terrorism is independence; they seek to expel outsiders or invaders from their lands. Their motivation may be related to ideological (self-determination) or religious issues. The FLN—Front de Libération Nationale or National Liberation Front—during the French occupation of Algeria, the mujahideen against the Soviet occupation, and to a certain degree contemporary insurgents in Afghanistan are included in this category. Some cases, on the other hand, are difficult to discern because there can be a strong religious component in their motivation, even if their goals are clearly political, as was the case with Irgun and Lehi in the pre-state of Israel, which can be classified as secessionists or resistant movements, depending on who is analyzing the groups. Eventually, what really matters is to identify terrorists' political goals and leading motivations.

⁵² Emilio Salgari, *Marulanda and the FARC for Beginners*, FARC-EP Educational Material, 2011. <http://farc-epeace.org/index.php/component/k2/item/292-marulanda-for-beginners.html>




Figure 1. Typologies of terrorism.

D. TERRORISM AS A SYSTEM

This thesis addresses terrorism as an open social system. Such a holistic approach takes into account not only the interactions within the terrorist organization or network, but also its interactions with the environment and the resultant effects on both. In the real world, it is quite difficult—not to say impossible—to manipulate one variable of the terrorism system while keeping all the others on standby,⁵³ because all of its components are interrelated and interdependent. For instance, the loss of control of violence during an action—no matter from what side—will impact the will to fight of both sides. A tactical move considered good at the start can turn out to be a very bad strategic option.

As in all open systems, terrorism has “a boundary, an input, an output and a throughput function.”⁵⁴ In other words, terrorism acquires inputs from the environment which are transformed into outputs that, in turn, will affect both terrorism and the environment.⁵⁵ According to Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, a systemic approach to insurgency offers four ways for conducting counterinsurgency: deny input, diminish the efficiency of the production process, raze the insurgency outputs, and reduce its outcomes on the environment.⁵⁶ They stress that the first three options are more productive than the

⁵³ In the academic world, this is commonly referred as “all other things being equal.”

⁵⁴ F. Heylighen, “Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach,” October 14, 1998, <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSAPPR.HTML>.

⁵⁵ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1970), 28–41.

⁵⁶ Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 36.

last one, as they concentrate on the supply side—inputs and throughputs in order to minimize the outputs—instead of on the demand side, as suggested by their last method.

Leites' and Wolf's analysis is brilliant, but while it focuses on the material means (m) of the inputs, it does not think through (w) as an input. According to Nikos Passas, to reduce the inputs of (m) into terrorism is a difficult task: "It is widely agreed that individual terrorist operations are surprisingly inexpensive. . . The truth is that such small amounts cannot be stopped."⁵⁷ To work on the throughputs is also difficult and demanding, as it relies on accurate intelligence, particularly if the traditional mindset indirectly leads all actions mainly against (m). This is exactly what has been done against terrorism, particularly following September 11: decapitation of leadership, body counting, and terrorism financing are thought about in terms of (m), even though they impact (w). As a result, the current approach cannot solve the problem: to keep (m) small—a necessary but insufficient condition⁵⁸—does not imply that (w) is small as well.

Based on Richardson's assertion that terrorists are made, not born,⁵⁹ it is plausible to assume that not only (m), but also (w) comes from the environment into the system as an input. The system, in turn, can transform these inputs by increasing their initial potential into outputs—such as constructed narratives—and reintroduce them into the environment. In this context, all four of Leites' and Wolf's methods are important as they can provide different levels of contribution to deal with the problem, as long as their outcomes are aligned with the strategic goal of reducing (w). Again, it is not only important to keep (m) low—what is already pursued by the conventional approach—but to make (w) reduce and stay down.

This chapter showed that terrorism has been a recurring problem during the course of human history. The term was defined as it shall be understood in the context of

⁵⁷ Nikos Passas, "Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas," in *Terrorist Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 31.

⁵⁸ Looking at the equation $T=mw$, one could argue that making $m=0$ or $w=0$ would be a sufficient condition to solve terrorism. Nevertheless, in the real world, there is probably no way of making m or $w=0$, but to make them small enough to be kept under control.

⁵⁹ Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*.

this thesis, followed by the proposal of broad classifications of terrorism based on its political goals and motivations. In order to analyze such a complex phenomenon, this paper relies on Bertalanffy's theory of open systems. Consistent with this theory, the next chapter will examine (w) in detail in order to identify the factors that generate it.

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III. THE WILL TO FIGHT

The will to fight is at the nub of all defeat mechanisms . . .
One should always look for a way to break the enemy's
will and capacity to resist.

—Huba Wass de Czege

The study of the will to fight is challenging because it deals with an intangible and blurred subject that cannot be quantified with the use of pure metrics. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the will to fight cannot be related to tangible and measurable variables responsible for its shaping and generation. This chapter defines the term “will to fight,” shows the importance of the will to fight for terrorist activities, identifies variables that influence terrorists’ will to fight, and offers a model that correlates the will to fight with terrorism.

A. WHAT IS “THE WILL TO FIGHT?”

As stated before, this thesis assumes Clausewitz’s relationship between the enemy’s power of resistance and his will to fight as one of its foundations. In his book, Clausewitz also claims that “the strength of his [the enemy’s] will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.”⁶⁰ Hence, in order to define what this thesis denotes as the will to fight it is natural that Clausewitz should be used as the starting point. For him, the will to fight is a moral factor:

They [moral factors] constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will is itself a moral quantity. Unfortunately they will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted. *They have to be seen or felt* [emphasis added].⁶¹

⁶⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 16.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 141.

He continues by suggesting that the will to fight is the “*energy, firmness, staunchness, emotional balance, and strength of character*. These products of a heroic nature could almost be treated as one and the same force—strength of will.”⁶² Simply put, the will to fight is an intangible energy that provides determination for fighting; the absence of this motivation should result in the end of armed hostilities.

The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary describes will as “a strong desire or determination to do something”⁶³ and to fight as “to resolve by struggle.”⁶⁴ Combining these definitions, the will to fight is “a strong desire to resolve something by struggle.” Henceforth, for the purpose of this thesis, the will to fight is defined as **the energy that impels an individual, a group, or an organization to resist or struggle against others.**

B. THE RELEVANCE OF THE WILL TO FIGHT

Academics and leaders acknowledge the importance of the will to fight in conflicts. The subject is so relevant that, according to Clausewitz, “the war . . . cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy’s will has not been broken.”⁶⁵ Liddell Hart maintains that “in war the chief incalculable is the human will.”⁶⁶ Churchill, in one of his famous speeches, said:

We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; *we shall never surrender* [emphasis added].⁶⁷

⁶² Ibid., 49.

⁶³ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s. v. “will,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com>.

⁶⁴ Ibid., s. v. “to fight.”

⁶⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 32.

⁶⁶ Hart, *Strategy*, 337.

⁶⁷ Winston Churchill, “We Shall Fight on the Beaches,” June 4, 1940, *The Churchill Centre*, <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/128-we-shall-fight-on-the-beaches>.

The Brazilian Army recognizes the significance of the will to fight, particularly in asymmetric conflicts:

In short, the strategy of resistance is designed to allow a militarily weak opponent to defeat a militarily powerful one. The material inferiority will be fully compensated by moral forces, by the undermining of the opponent's will to fight, and by the adoption of innovative strategies and tactics. The strong will be defeated as a natural consequence of his fatigue (prostration) and due to the loss of his will to fight (psychological defeat).⁶⁸

Vo Nguyen Giap, after the Vietnam War, declared, "We [North Vietnamese] were not strong enough to drive out a half million American troops, but that wasn't our aim. Our intention was to break the will of the American government to continue the war."⁶⁹ In another interview, he pointed out that:

Your objective in war can either be to wipe out the enemy altogether or to leave their forces partly intact but their will to fight destroyed. It was the American policy to try and escalate the war. Our goal in the '68 offensive was to force them to de-escalate, to break the American will to remain in the war. . . . We did this by confronting them with repeated military, as well as political and diplomatic victories.⁷⁰

Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri, the so-called "Architect of Global Jihad," also highlights the will to fight in combat:

All military schools agree that a will to fight and moral strength of the fighter is the basis for victory and good performance. . . . The proof of the sincerity of this will is that he makes the necessary preparations for that decision In our situation, which is jihad . . . preparation is the fruit of sincere will. When the will is sincere and the determination is firm, one starts making preparations according to his capabilities, in order to terrorize the enemies of God and the Muslims *This combat will . . . is his basic weapon, which moves him to do whatever he is capable of,*

⁶⁸ Brazilian Army, *Estratégia*, C124-1, trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba (Brasília, DF: 2001), 2–9.

⁶⁹ Margie Mason and Chris Brummitt, "Legendary Vietnam Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap Dies," *Yahoo News*, October 4, 2013 (accessed November 3, 2013), <http://news.yahoo.com/legendary-vietnam-gen-vo-nguyen-giap-dies-132952927.html>.

⁷⁰ People's Century, "Interview with Vo Nguyen Giap Viet Minh Commander" (accessed November 3, 2013), <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/guerrillawars/giaptranscript.html>.

[emphasis added] even using civilian weapons, if there is nothing else available.⁷¹

Finally, a recent RAND study of 59 core insurgency cases shows the preponderance of commitment and motivation (will to fight) in those kinds of conflicts:

Commitment and motivation refers to the extent to which the government and COIN [counterinsurgency] forces demonstrated that they were actually committed to defeating the insurgency . . . In all COIN wins, both the government and the COIN force demonstrated their commitment and motivation, whereas the *insurgents won all 17 of the cases in which commitment and motivation were assessed as lacking* [emphasis added].⁷²

C. WHERE DOES THE WILL TO FIGHT COME FROM?

Clausewitz asserts that “[o]f all the passions that inspire man in battle, none, we have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honour and renown. . . . In war they act as the essential breath of life that animates the inert mass.”⁷³ Clausewitz is most likely referring to the will to fight of soldiers, not terrorists, although the factors may apply to both actors. At this point, nevertheless, it is important to identify and organize the variables that generate terrorists’ will to fight based on “terrorist organization’s perception and interpretation of the situation”⁷⁴—according to reasons claimed by successful revolutionary leaders and well-known terrorists—and at the assumptions of distinguished scholars.

For Mao the will to fight can be associated with the concept of relative deprivation: “Any ideology—even the very best, even Marxism-Leninism itself—is ineffective unless it is linked with objective realities, meets objectively existing needs and has been grasped by the masses of the people.”⁷⁵ Also it seems that the issuance of

⁷¹ Brynjar Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad: the Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri* (London: Hurst, 2007), 469–70.

⁷² Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, xviii–xix.

⁷³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 50.

⁷⁴ Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 385.

⁷⁵ Mao Tse-Tung and Zedong Mao, “The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History, September 16, 1949” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, Vol. IV (San Francisco, CA: China Books, 1972), 457.

his “Eight Points for Attention”⁷⁶ was due to his understanding of the power of revenge on man’s determination. In other words, ideology—combined with the sense of perceived injustice—and revenge are prompters of the will to fight.

Latin American Marxist guerrilla fighter Che Guevara wrote in his letters: “My Marxism has taken root and become purified. I believe in armed struggle as the only solution for those peoples who fight to free themselves, and I am consistent with my beliefs. . . .⁷⁷ I carry to new battlefronts the faith that you taught me, the revolutionary spirit of my people, the feeling of fulfilling the most sacred of duties: to fight against imperialism wherever it may be.”⁷⁸ As a result, his will to fight came from a strong belief in an ideology and from the fact that he was convinced that he was doing the right thing against his enemy: imperial capitalism. For him, culture—the revolutionary spirit of his people—seemed also to be an issue.

The Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that the will to fight for the Iranian Revolution came from a religious belief, a perceived injustice, and a nationalist ideology:

The will of almighty God . . . decreed the release of this oppressed nation from the yoke of the tyranny and crimes of the satanical regime and from the yoke of the domination of oppressive powers . . . It is our duty to stand up to the superpowers and . . . follow the straight path of Islam and nationalism. . . . The noble nation should know that the entire victory was achieved through the will of almighty God and . . . through the spirit of faith and a spirit of self-sacrifice . . .⁷⁹

Al-Qaeda strategist Al-Suri states that the motives for terrorism can be religious, social or economic.⁸⁰ He also asserts that some strategic preconditions—geographical,

⁷⁶ The referenced points are: speak politely; pay fairly for what you buy; return everything you borrow; pay for anything you damage; do not hit or swear at people; do not damage crops; do not take liberties with women; and do not ill-treat captives. Mao-Tse Tung and Zedong Mao, “On the Reissue of the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention - Instruction of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, October 10, 1947” in *Selected Works*, 155.

⁷⁷ Ernesto Che Guevara, *Che Guevara Reader: Writings on Politics and Revolution* (North Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 2012), 384.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 387.

⁷⁹ Ayatollah Khomeini, “We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology,” in *MERIP Reports*, no. 88, *Iran’s Revolution: The First Year* (June 1980), 22.

⁸⁰ Lia, *Architect of Global Jihad*, 377.

population, and political factors—are required for success in Open Front Jihad.⁸¹ The political factors “include the presence of a cause in which the local inhabitants can *believe, in a way that is sufficient for making them fight a jihad for its sake*”⁸² [emphasis added]. For him, in Afghanistan, the motivation for terrorism is religion and tribalism; in Chechnya, religion and nationalism; and in Bosnia, religion and survival.⁸³ Therefore, based on his view, the will to fight may come from religion, nationalism, culture, and self-preservation.

Martin van Creveld claims that fighters must have a strong motive for risking everything by going to war⁸⁴ and that these reasons are not related to interest—at least not to mundane ones—because “dead men have no interests.”⁸⁵ For him, war is a thrilling event and “[f]ighting itself can be a source of joy, perhaps even the greatest joy of all.”⁸⁶ He points out religion as another important source of resolution: “Many Christians as well as Muslims believe that their religion obliges them to fight and that it will render them bulletproof.”⁸⁷ Revenge is an extra strong reason: “Not only is revenge one of the commonest causes of war, but it is also one of the most powerful and least controllable emotions. Taking revenge, we feel that we ‘get our own back,’ as the saying goes, compensating for power we have lost and gaining what we did not previously have.”⁸⁸ He provides other examples: “God, country, nation, race, class, justice, honor, freedom, equality, fraternity come under the same category of myths for which men are prepared to give their lives and for which, in fact, they have always given their lives.”⁸⁹ Hence, for Creveld, joy, religious faith, revenge, ideology, ethnicity, honor, and perceived injustice are certainly motors of the will to fight.

⁸¹ Ibid., 374–5.

⁸² Ibid., 375.

⁸³ Ibid., 376–7.

⁸⁴ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 166.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 158.

⁸⁶ Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York: Presidio Press, 2008), xi.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 305.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 112.

⁸⁹ Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 166.

For Crenshaw, “concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority;”⁹⁰ perceived injustice: “if terrorists perceive the state as unjust, morally corrupt, and violent, then terrorism may seem legitimate and justified;”⁹¹ a strong belief in a higher good: “they are people who tolerate high risk because of intense commitment to a cause. Their commitment is strong enough to make the risk of personal harm acceptable and perhaps to outweigh the cost of society’s rejection;”⁹² the desire for revenge: “single common emotion that drives the individual to become a terrorist, it is vengeance on behalf of comrades or even the constituency the terrorist aspires to represent;”⁹³ and the lack of opportunity for political participation is a motive for terrorism. Hence, it is logical to accept that, for Crenshaw, the will to fight is driven by ethnic grievances, perceived injustice, solid belief in a cause, and revenge.

According to Bard O’Neill, the following factors provide the will to fight: hatred, revenge, tolerance of violence, historical rivalries, ethnicity, religion, and how just or unjust the conflict is perceived to be.⁹⁴ Revenge, for instance, is referenced as a very important factor: “Every time a Russian helicopter gunship strafes a village, every man in it will not rest until he has drawn Russian blood.”⁹⁵

Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjølberg, citing Corrado, suggest that motives for terrorism come from ideologies and values.⁹⁶ They also mention Wilkinson’s view that terrorists’ motivations spring from ideologies and beliefs.⁹⁷ They continue by saying that “explanations for why extremist groups find terrorism useful is the thesis that it results from the failure of other attempts to achieve influence, in particular the ineffectiveness of

⁹⁰ Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 383.

⁹¹ Ibid., 390.

⁹² Ibid., 393.

⁹³ Ibid., 394.

⁹⁴ O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism*.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 81.

⁹⁶ Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjølberg, “Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature,” *Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt Rapportdatabase* (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004), 10.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 14.

non-violent means of struggle to address political or ethnic grievances.”⁹⁸ For them “[v]engeance as a motive in terrorism is perhaps more visible when the terrorist campaign is well under way, than it is at its onset.”⁹⁹ Lia and Skjølberg indicate that relative deprivation and inequality are also causes of terrorism.¹⁰⁰ In short, the will to fight may derive from ideologies, values, beliefs, ethnic problems, and perceived injustice.

For Rapoport, terrorists’ motivations are captured in four distinct waves. “As their names—‘Anarchist,’ ‘anticolonial,’ ‘New Left,’ and ‘Religious’—suggest, a different energy drives each.”¹⁰¹ In other words, revenge, perceived injustice, ideology, ethnic problems, and religion¹⁰² are forces that have motivated generations of terrorists to fight for their causes; they have created the will to fight. He also implies that these energies have different levels of influence on the will to fight and religion is probably the strongest. “Each [prior wave] was inspired by a secular cause, and a striking characteristic of religious communities is how durable some are.”¹⁰³

For Ganor the motives for terrorism can be “religious, political, social or economic.”¹⁰⁴ Religion, for instance, is considered a strong driver: “their [Islamic terrorists] motives, as reflected in their radical religious ideology and their belief in God’s command to disseminate their version of religion throughout the world using aggressive means . . . make international terrorism the most serious strategic threat to global peace and safety of the world.”¹⁰⁵ He also points out that it may be a “direct result of feelings of humiliation and anger for nationalist or social reasons, or in light of a personal-family experience.”¹⁰⁶ Another solid factor can be “a result of a momentary whim, generally

⁹⁸ Ibid., 15.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 17.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 70.

¹⁰¹ Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 47.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 66.

¹⁰⁴ Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle*, 24.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 293.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 36.

motivated by a desire for revenge”¹⁰⁷ or what he calls a boomerang effect. “ Hamas spokespersons . . . have threatened from time to time that their organizations plan to dispatch ten suicide bombers in revenge for a ‘targeted killing’ operation.”¹⁰⁸ In other words, religion, honor, ideology, and revenge are probable sources of the will to fight.

According to Bjørge, there are various levels of causes of terrorism: structural (people do not necessarily grasp the influence of such causes in their lives); facilitating causes (“make terrorism possible or attractive, without being prime movers”);¹⁰⁹ motivational causes (“the actual grievances that people experience at a personal level, motivating them to act”);¹¹⁰ and triggering causes (the immediate prompters).¹¹¹ Although all of these causes may have an impact on the will to fight, motivational causes seem to be the ones that are directly related to its genesis. Bjørge asserts that religion, nationalism, ethnicity, revenge, honor, and personal satisfaction are some terrorists’ motives;¹¹² in other words, they are the basis of their will to fight.

Richardson summarizes terrorists’ motivations in three words: revenge, renown, and reaction.¹¹³ Slicing up the first two words, she asserts that revenge and glory are some of the factors that motivate terrorism. “Those who become martyrs appear to do so out of a combination of motives: anger, humiliation, a desire for revenge . . . and a desire to attain glory.”¹¹⁴ Honor is pointed out as another variable: “An insurgent was adamant that we had to defend our honor no matter what the cost.”¹¹⁵ She emphasizes religion as a

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 79.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 257.

¹⁰⁹ Bjørge, ed., *Root Causes of Terrorism*, 3–4.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid. Bjørge provides some examples: structural causes (demographic imbalances, globalization, rapid modernization, transitional societies, increasing individualism with rootlessness and atomization, relative deprivation, class structure); facilitator causes (the evolution of modern news media, transportation, weapons technology, weak state control of territory); triggering causes (momentous or provocative events, a political calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or some other events that call for revenge or action).

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*. Reaction, in this case, is not a motive for the will to fight.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 15.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., xvii.

very significant driver. “Religion serves to incite, to mobilize, and to legitimize terrorist actions. Moreover, religions’ preoccupation with fundamental notions of good and evil tends to ensure that movements with religious motives are much less prone to compromise.”¹¹⁶ Perceived injustice is also another motive. “It is not so much a vision of a new world, therefore, that drives even the leaders of these [terrorist] groups but rather their outrage at the injustices of the present one.”¹¹⁷ This factor is stressed in a quote from a Palestinian prisoner in Israel:

In your [Israeli] occupation you never distinguish between man and women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of collective punishment . . . You set up detention camps for thousands of people in sub-human conditions. You destroyed homes and turned children into orphans Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way.¹¹⁸

A strong belief in a cause motivates as well. “They [IRA] were motivated by a desire to right wrongs and to do their best for a noble cause.”¹¹⁹ Ideology is also embedded: “Nationalism has never ceased in its attraction to those prepared to fight for the ‘freedom’ of their group.”¹²⁰ Hence, for Richardson, revenge, glory, honor, religion, perceived injustice, ideology, and the belief in a cause prompt terrorists’ will to fight.

Hoffman presents vengeance, ideologies, ethno-nationalism, racial intolerance, and religion as motivations for terrorism.¹²¹ He emphasizes that religious motivations for terrorism have “often led to more intense acts of violence that have produced considerably higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations.”¹²² Hoffman also highlights revenge as a strong factor. “The abuse that ordinary people suffer at the hands of the army [is] the primary motivating factor to join the [Tamil] Tigers [in Sri

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 68.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 88.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 93.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., xv.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 238.

¹²¹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.

¹²² Ibid., 88.

Lanka].”¹²³ Hence, it is reasonable to assume that for him the will to fight may be engendered by a desire for revenge, ideology, ethnic problems, and religious beliefs.

Anna Simons asserts that “[c]orporate loyalty, spiritual hunger and the need to prove moral worth are just some of the drives that can inspire acts of self-sacrifice.”¹²⁴ She also points out adolescence as a motivator for terrorism, as some young men are naturally attracted to violence, particularly when they seek social recognition.¹²⁵ Quoting two prominent Native Americans, Simons shows that ideology is also another factor: “Better to die as an Indian than live as a white man.”¹²⁶ Their will to fight, in this case, came from the belief that “what they were defending was the only right or true way to live.”¹²⁷ So, for Simons, the will to fight may originate in by loyalty, religion, honor, adolescence, and ideology. She also suggests that these motivators provide different levels of willpower by highlighting that “ideology has never equaled religion as a motivating factor for believers.”¹²⁸

For Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, the Roman overreaction against the Zealots only created the desire for revenge. “On several occasions, the Roman army captured hundreds of rebels, who were tortured before being put to death in the most painful ways possible. Far from cooling the ardor of the Zealot fighters, such reprisals seem only to have galvanized the men and women in their ranks.”¹²⁹ They also point out ideology as a source of the will to fight. “It is also true, however, that a nationalist cause is generally much more powerful in motivating people than a social issue, and all else being equal, the intensity of violence stemming from nationalistic sentiments is therefore

¹²³ Ibid., 140.

¹²⁴ Anna Simons, “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part I,” *The American Interest* (Mount Morris: The American Interest, 2006), 8.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 8–11.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 14.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Simons, “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part II,” *The American Interest* (Mount Morris: The American Interest, 2006), 40.

¹²⁹ Chaliand and Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism*, 58.

usually greater than that generated by socioeconomic grievances.”¹³⁰ For them, religion is also a fountain of the will to fight; “the religious point of reference was long central to most societies, and this phenomenon has not yet exhausted itself.”¹³¹

In “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis,” Anthony Pratkanis states that perceived injustice is a strong driver of the will to fight:

The perception of an injustice is one of the strongest motivations for encouraging attacks, including aggression and war. . . . As a core human motivation, people attempt to restore justice, including resorting to violence and aggression, especially when the injustice is perceived as a threat to one’s self-worth (Baumeister and Boden 1998). The history of warfare is the history of the perception of injustice, whether the injustice be real, manufactured, or imagined.¹³²

Frank Barrett and Theodore Sarbin claim that revenge is another solid originator:

Humiliation was indeed a motivator for Marwan. He was inspired to become a suicide bomber after he witnessed an injustice: he said that in April 2003 he saw U.S. soldiers fire on a crowd of demonstrators at a school, killing twelve and wounding more. He sought revenge, and eventually he was linked with Islamic radicals and was socialized into jihadist ways: ‘I read about the history of jihad, about great martyrs who have gone before me. These things strengthen my will.’¹³³

In addition, David Ronfeldt pinpoints honor as a variable:

As individuals, families, clans, and tribes as a whole assert their place and maneuver for position, maximizing honor—not power or profit—is normally their paramount motivation. . . . [W]arlords and warriors fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other tribal zones are renowned for the value

¹³⁰ Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” in *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda*, eds. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (University of California Press, 2007), 39–40.

¹³¹ Chaliand and Blin, eds., *The History of Terrorism*, viii.

¹³² Anthony R. Pratkanis, “Winning Hearts and Minds: A Social Influence Analysis,” in *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 70.

¹³³ Frank J. Barrett and Theodore R. Sarbin, “The Rhetoric of Terror: ‘War’ as Misplaced Metaphor,” in *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 27.

they place on upholding codes of honor and avoiding shameful humiliation.¹³⁴

For Martin, perceived injustice and the desire for revenge are sources of motivation for terrorism as “radicalized sentiment grew out of frustration with the slow pace of change and the violent reaction of some of their opponents.”¹³⁵ Ethnic differences are another cause, particularly for the ETA, IRA, and the Palestinians,¹³⁶ since historical events such as “massacres, forced migrations, or extended repression can affect them for generations.”¹³⁷ Moral convictions, an “unambiguous certainty of the righteousness of their cause,”¹³⁸ codes of self-sacrifice, and ideological utopias are pointed to by him as possible causes.¹³⁹ Hence, it is logical to deduce that, for Martin, perceived injustice, revenge, ethnic differences, moral convictions, codes of self-sacrifice—in other words, honor—and ideology are potential generators of the will to fight.

Alex Schmid provides many motives for terrorism: revenge, demands, propaganda/attention, overreaction, disruption, desire for martyrdom, morale building; elimination of opposing forces, and extortion of money.¹⁴⁰ The ones that can be more closely related to the will to fight are revenge and strong religious belief (as in seeking martyrdom). In another section of the book, he claims that “[t]he motivations to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives.”¹⁴¹ He sums up by listing 48 possible root causes of terrorism asserted by

¹³⁴ David Ronfeldt, “Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates: A Global Tribe Waging Segmental Warfare,” in *Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice*, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 37.

¹³⁵ Martin, *Understanding Terrorism*, 65.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 82–90.

¹⁴⁰ Schmid, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, 6.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

more than 200 experts. The variables more directly related to the will to fight are: giving the powerless a sense of power, revenge, a culture of martyrdom, extreme ideologies, perceived injustice, disappointment over the likelihood of political change through non-violent means, nationalism, intolerance, and the belief in narratives of historical events.¹⁴²

Another aspect that needs to be analyzed is the relationship between economics and terrorists' will to fight, particularly because poverty as a root cause of terrorism is a very controversial theme among scholars. According to Schmid, although many United Nations speakers pointed out poverty as a root cause of terrorism right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many experts claim that such a theory is "ill-founded and misleading."¹⁴³ Jitka Malecková, for instance, states that "the evidence on both the individual and the national level [of our research] indicated that there is no direct connection between poverty and terrorism, at least in the case of international terrorist activities."¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, citing Hudson, Malecková mentions that:

Increasingly, terrorist groups are recruiting members who possess a high degree of intellectualism and idealism, are highly educated, and are well trained in a legitimate profession. However, this may not necessarily be the case with the younger, lower ranks of large guerrilla/terrorist organizations in less-developed countries, such as the FARC, the PKK, the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], and Arab groups, as well as with some of the leaders of these groups.¹⁴⁵

For Ted Robert Gurr "[p]overty per se is not a direct cause of terrorism."¹⁴⁶ He continues by stating that "[m]ilitant movements frequently draw on what Bjørge calls fellow-travelers and criminals—people motivated by social needs and pressures and

¹⁴² Ibid., "Appendix 4.1 Psychological, Political, Economic, Religious and Cultural (Root) Causes of Terrorism, According to Scholars Gathered at the Club de Madrid Conference of 2005," 272–4.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 16.

¹⁴⁴ Jitka Malecková, "Impoverished Terrorists: Stereotype or Reality," in *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*, ed. Tore Bjørge (New York: Routledge, 2005), 41.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 39.

¹⁴⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism*, Volume I (Madrid: 2005), 19.

chances for personal gain rather than ideology.”¹⁴⁷ Hence, economic incentives as generators of the will to fight do not imply that poverty is a root cause of terrorism; it means that some individuals are prone to join terrorist groups for greed or as a way to make a living.¹⁴⁸ Army Major Keith Boring, during a 2012 interview at the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, explained how Al-Qaeda was “employing” people to lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq:

With al-Qaeda, they were very good with propaganda, themes of common culture and common language—a lot of those are actually economic, they also pay people. ‘Here’s \$100. Dig a hole for me. Don’t ask why.’ There was high unemployment there; anyone would go for a job so being paid \$100 just to dig a ditch—one guy digs a ditch and the other guy gets \$100 or \$50 just to—’Here’s a box, just put this in the ditch.’¹⁴⁹

The aforementioned example shows that terrorist groups sometimes use financial incentives as a recruiting tool for their ranks, including mercenaries—as some Russians fighting in Syria—that act for greed or poor people who may perceive the situation as a means of subsistence. This latter motivation seems to be the case of some FARC members. According to Jeanie Gong, “Particularly for those living in extremely poor areas of the country, becoming a guerrilla fighter can be a more attractive option than other alternatives. For some, the FARC provides a way to escape from a dead-end life.”¹⁵⁰ Gurr, citing Gold, indicates that “[e]conomics is not just about whether economic variables can help explain observed outcomes. It is most fundamentally about how human behaviour is shaped by the interaction of incentives and constraints.”¹⁵¹ As a

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴⁸ Narcotraffickers, Mafia, and Yakuza and other criminal organizations commonly designated as “criminal terrorist organizations” are not included in this situation, as the violence they use is motivated by greed, not for political purposes.

¹⁴⁹ Mark Thompson, “IEDs, C.O.D.,” *TIME.com*, February 22, 2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/02/22/ieds-c-o-d/>.

¹⁵⁰ Jeanie Gong, “FARC – Rebels with a Cause?” *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, July 6, 2010, <http://www.coha.org/farc-%E2%80%93-rebels-with-a-cause/>.

¹⁵¹ Gurr, *Addressing the Causes of Terrorism*, 19.

result, it is logical to conclude that financial reasons (greed or poverty) are prompters of the will to fight¹⁵² for some terrorists.

Table 1 summarizes the variables and the number of times each one was cited. Although perceived injustice is mentioned many times, it is not considered a particular factor, but one that is embedded in the first four:

Nr	Factor	Occurrences
1.	Religion	12
2.	Ideology (Marxism-Leninism, nationalism)	15
3.	Ethnicity	8
4.	Revenge	12
5.	Values (honor, loyalty, moral)	10
6.	Renown (glory)	2
7.	Joy (includes adolescence)	2
8.	Culture	3
9.	Financial incentives (greed or poverty)	-

Table 1. Variables of the will to fight.

Cultural factors do not seem to be a generator of the will to fight, but a variable that influences it in different degrees, depending on the cultural group that is the subject of study. According to Ruth Benedict,

The diversity of cultures can be endlessly documented. A field of human behaviour may be ignored in some societies until it barely exists; it may even be in some cases unimagined. . . . standards, no matter in what aspect of behaviour, range in different cultures from the positive to the negative pole. . . . A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern

¹⁵² It can be argued that the same thing happens with defense or security forces of the State. Not all in the military join their services due to beliefs—mainly nationalism—but some do for economic purposes. This occurs not only in poor countries where conscription is mandatory and military payment sometimes is the highest available in the market, but also in developed and rich countries that rely on volunteers to fill in their ranks.

of thought and action. Within each culture there come into being characteristic purposes not necessarily shared by other types of society.¹⁵³

She continues by stating that each culture “responds” differently to specific situations, particularly to war. According to Benedict, “All the miscellaneous behavior directed toward . . . warring . . . is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with unconscious canons of choice that develop within the culture.”¹⁵⁴ Benedict provides two examples of how cultural differences affect the perception of the same situation: “They [the Japanese] also admire certain forms of violence and direct action and private revenge which Americans do not”¹⁵⁵ and “Giri [duty to ‘clear’ one’s reputation of insult or imputation of failure]¹⁵⁶ to one’s name and all the hostility and watchful waiting that accompany it in any culture, however, is not a virtue that is characteristic of the Asiatic mainland. . . . The Chinese do not have it, nor the Siamese, nor the Indians.”¹⁵⁷

In line with Benedict, Crenshaw states that “social myths, traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom,”¹⁵⁸ and Creveld argues that “generations that have not themselves been involved in the fighting are often at a loss to understand what their predecessors got so excited about and shed their blood for.”¹⁵⁹ Therefore, it is valid to conclude that culture influences the will to fight by increasing, reducing, or delaying its growth over time and that its value is unique for each culture.

Based on all of the above, this work assumes that the will to fight can, in a broader sense, be created by the belief in a cause, be it a religion, an ideology, ethnicity, or values; a desire for revenge; and the search for satisfaction (renown, joy, or financial incentives). Religious and ideological beliefs tend to hinge on perceived injustices, as

¹⁵³ Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (1934; repr., New York: Mariner Books, 2005), 52–3.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 54.

¹⁵⁵ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (1967; repr., New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006), 82.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 92.

¹⁵⁸ Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 382.

¹⁵⁹ Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 167.

does revenge (see Figure 2). Culture alone is not considered to be a generator of the will to fight, but a factor that influences the predisposition to employ violence when faced with specific situations.




Figure 2. The variables of the will to fight.

D. MODELING THE WILL TO FIGHT

For Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, warfare is, most of all, an art. However, this does not mean that elements of science do not or cannot exist in the realm of war. In this case, such components can be used to support the art of war, as stated by Captain Francis V. Greene in 1883:

War is, above all things, an art, employing science in all its branches as its servant, but depending first and chiefly upon the skill of the artisan. It has its own rules, but not one of them is rigid and invariable. As new implements are devised new methods result in its mechanical execution, but over and above all its mechanical appliances it rests upon the complex factors of human nature, which cannot be reduced to formulas and rules.¹⁶⁰

The use of science to analyze conflicts is so attractive because it can provide—or at least it intends to—tools for comparing one’s own capacity with the enemy’s, thereby reducing some of the uncertainties embedded in waging prolonged fighting. But can this view be applied to terrorism? To quantify or compare numbers of people, doctrines, equipment, and weapons is relatively easy; to measure one’s will to fight or behavior seems to be a completely different challenge. Furthermore, the multidimensional character of the will to fight, as described in the previous section, suggests that it cannot be evaluated based on a single variable nor can it be isolated from other factors present in the real world. Nevertheless, as Clausewitz said, “The will [to fight] is not a wholly unknown factor; we can base a forecast of its state tomorrow on what it is today.”¹⁶¹

This thesis’ primary assumption about terrorists’ power of resistance (T) can be stated as:

$$T = mw$$

where

- m denotes the terrorists’ resources; and
- w is the strength of their will to fight.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Army, *Urban Operations*, FM 3–06 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 4–1.

¹⁶¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 17.

In the spirit of Clausewitz, we offer the following function to capture the relationship of the important variables that determine the will to fight:

$$w_t = f(b + r + s)_t c_t$$

where

- b denotes the summation of all beliefs (religious, ideological, ethnic, and values) at time t ;
- r is the desire for revenge at time t ;
- s is the summation of the desires for satisfaction (renown, joy, and finances) at time t ; and
- c represents culture at time t .

With some initial values, b_0 for belief, r_0 for the desire for revenge, and s_0 for the desire of satisfaction, the value of w_t can be calculated over time for each $t \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$.

The very first time a terrorist action occurs demands the existence of a minimum amount of will to fight—a critical value (w_c)—and sufficient resources (see Figure 3):

$$0 < w_c < w \text{ and } 0 < m_c < m$$

where

- m_c denotes the terrorists' minimum amount of resources to conduct terrorist actions; and
- w_c is the minimum amount of will to fight in order to resort to terrorism.




Figure 3. Terrorism areas.

Therefore, as long as $w < w_c$, there will be no terrorism. The will to fight can also be expressed as a function of time:

$$w_{t+1} = w_t + a_t w_t$$

where

- a_t is the result of the impacts of terrorists' actions (terrorist attacks, pro-narratives, etc.) and environmental actions—from the state or any other player (attacks against terrorists, counter-narratives, security measures, etc.)—on terrorists' will to fight at time t ; it may be a positive or a negative value; and
- w_t is a measure of terrorists' will to fight at time t .

With some initial values, w_0 for the will to fight and a_0 for the overall impact of the actions, the value of w_t can be calculated over time for each $t \in \{1, 2, 3, \dots\}$.

Based on the aforementioned equations, it is logical to conclude that the only ways of diminishing (w) is by decreasing (b), (r), (s), or (c) values or by making $a_t < 0$. Moreover, inasmuch as $w < w_c$, terrorism should not occur at all. Hence, once the generators of the will to fight have been identified, it is possible to seek actions that can make the above variables decrease across time in order to mitigate terrorism.

This chapter began by explaining the expression “will to fight.” Then, the significance of the term for terrorism was highlighted and the variables responsible for generating such willpower were pinpointed. In the final section, a simple model for the will to fight was presented. In the next chapter, Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight is analyzed according to the suggested model.

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO'S WILL TO FIGHT

A habit cannot be tossed out the window; it must be coaxed down the stairs a step at a time.

—Mark Twain

The Sendero Luminoso—Shining Path—is considered to be one of the most violent Latin American insurgent groups that have resorted to terrorism. This chapter presents a historical overview of Peru and the Sendero Luminoso, identifies the prompters of the organization's will to fight and how this will has changed over time, and analyzes the effect of government responses to the group's will to fight.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand the framing processes¹⁶² that the Sendero Luminoso used to mobilize and gain support, it is important to outline the history of Peru beginning with the Spanish conquest of the Incan Empire.

Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro captured Incan Emperor Atahualpa—the last Sapa Inca¹⁶³—in the Battle of Cajamarca in 1532¹⁶⁴ and killed him the following year. The outcomes were devastating for the natives, also called Amerindians: the Incan social structure collapsed, the northern highlands people were completely

¹⁶² In Social Movement Theory framing processes are “the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.” Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, “Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements,” in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2–3.

¹⁶³ In Quechua, unique leader or only emperor. The Sapa Inca was the head of all civil, military, and religious powers. Barbara A. Somervill, “Society, Inca.” *Empire of the Inca*, Great Empires of the Past. New York: Facts On File, 2005. *Ancient and Medieval History Online*. Facts On File, <http://www.fofweb.com/History/MainPrintPage.asp?iPin=GEINC022&DataType=Ancient&WinType=Free>.

¹⁶⁴ Osprey Publishing, “The Battle of Cajamarca (16 November),” http://www.ospreypublishing.com/articles/the_battle_of_cajamarca_16_november.

demoralized,¹⁶⁵ and political and economic power was transferred from Cuzco to Lima, Peru's newly created capital, in 1534. The Spanish Crown established the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1543 and soon the *encomienda*¹⁶⁶ was adopted; in other words, many natives were not only converted to the Catholic faith, but also forced into slavery.

In 1569 Viceroy Francisco de Toledo reorganized the administration of the territory. He destroyed the Incan State of Vilcabamba in the Peruvian jungle and executed the “last legitimate legal threat to Spanish rule in the Andes,”¹⁶⁷ the Incan Emperor Túpac Amaru. Toledo gathered the Amerindians in *reducciones*—villages created to concentrate and to reposition them—in order to better “take care of the natives.”¹⁶⁸ He also altered and reintroduced the *mita*,¹⁶⁹ so there would always be workers for the mines. According to Melissa Dell, “The *mita* required over 200 indigenous communities to send one-seventh of their adult male population to work in the Potosí silver and Huancavelica mercury mines.”¹⁷⁰ For Montero, the “*mita* has been considered the worst example of forced labour ever since the struggle for independence.”¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁵ The “Inca state was vulnerable to decapitation; the structure was incapable of functioning in the absence of its keystone.” George Kubler, “The Behavior of Atahualpa, 1531–1533,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* (1945), 425–6. doi:10.2307/2508231.

¹⁶⁶ *Encomiendas* were “a grant of land by the king to loyal subjects, principally the early conquistadores, that carried with it the assigned labor of Indians.” The landholder, or *encomendero*, “had two obligations to the Crown: to turn the Indians on the *encomienda* into good Catholics and to protect them. As long as the *encomendero* fulfilled these duties, he was allowed a free hand to use Indian labor and to demand payments for himself from the Indians.” Christine Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2004), 43.

¹⁶⁷ Christopher Minster, “Biography of Túpac Amaru,” *About.com*, <http://latinamericanhistory.about.com/od/theconquestofperu/p/tupacamaru1.htm>.

¹⁶⁸ Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru*, 53.

¹⁶⁹ The *mita* was a form of tax paid to the Inca that was most commonly done with transitory and rotational work. “Mita laborers served as soldiers, farmers, messengers, road builders, or whatever needed to be done.” Discover Peru, “Economy of the Inca Empire,” <http://www.discover-peru.org/inca-economy-society/>.

¹⁷⁰ Melissa Dell, “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining *Mita*,” *Econometrica* 78, no. 6 (November 2010), 1863.

¹⁷¹ Raquel Gil Montero, *Free and Unfree Labour in the Colonial Andes in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, <http://www.econ.unavarra.es/seminarios/2011/110509%20Gil%20Montero%20final%20version.doc>.

The treatment that was given to the Amerindians finally resulted in the rebellion of José Gabriel Condorcanqui, better known as the Túpac Amaru Rebellion, in 1780.¹⁷² Despite the killing of Túpac Amaru in 1781, the war against Spain continued for two more years. Even after Peru's Independence in 1824, the natives were still excluded from the political power, which was only transferred from the Spanish *peninsulares* to the creole elites of the new country,¹⁷³ a situation that did not considerably change in the following century.

The city of Ayacucho, Sendero's birthplace, although founded in 1540, was connected to the rest of the country by road only in 1924.¹⁷⁴ In short, highland and inland individuals (mostly Amerindians) were constantly ignored or marginalized by the elites (for the most part white creoles living at the coast); this was a fact that not only split the country in two different cultures but also created a "disparity between the prosperous coastal cities and the impoverished highlands."¹⁷⁵

B. THE SENDERO LUMINOSO

Sendero Luminoso is a group of Maoist ideologues whose goal is to overthrow the government of Peru and replace it with a communist-peasant administration. This revolution is to be done based on the following strategic goals: "Convert the backward areas into advanced and solid base of revolutionary support; attack the symbols of the bourgeois state; generalize violence and develop a guerilla war; conquer and expand the bases of support; and lay siege to the cities and bring about the total collapse of the state."¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² Encyclopaedia Britannica, s. v. "Viceroyalty of Peru," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/453253/Viceroyalty-of-Peru>.

¹⁷³ Mongabay.com, "Peru," http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/peru/all.html.

¹⁷⁴ Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, "Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)," *United States Army Special Operations Command, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, Volume II – 1962–2009, 54.

¹⁷⁵ Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics* 37, no. 1 (October 1984), 48–84, quoted in Buikema and Burger, "Sendero Luminoso," 51–3.

¹⁷⁶ David Scott Palmer, "Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso," *Comparative Politics* 18, no. 2 (January 1986), 127–146, quoted in Buikema and Burger, "Sendero Luminoso," 57.

In 1959, the Peruvian government reopened the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga in the city of Ayacucho.¹⁷⁷ Three years later, Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán Reynoso—nom de guerre President Gonzalo—became a professor of philosophy at the institution. Taking advantage of the fact that the school was a “haven for radical political discussion, focused on Marxist principles,”¹⁷⁸ he started to preach his Marxist ideology to the students. At this time, Guzmán belonged to the Communist Party of Peru–Red Flag.¹⁷⁹

Believing that the only way to overthrow the state was through the employment of armed struggle, Guzmán broke with the party to found the Communist Party of Peru–Sendero Luminoso¹⁸⁰ in 1970. By then, as the university’s director of human resources, he was able “to hire loyalists and like-minded individuals to positions of influence in the university and the local community.”¹⁸¹ In 1975, Guzmán was ousted from the university and moved his efforts to the deprived provinces, without losing his links with his sympathizers at Huamanga.¹⁸² It is important to mention that his former students were becoming “teachers and local leaders in these same impoverished provinces.”¹⁸³

Guzmán used his abilities as a speaker¹⁸⁴ and charismatic personality to exploit natives’ beliefs,¹⁸⁵ and the fact that Ayacucho was “geographically, socially, and economically marginalized”¹⁸⁶ to make Sendero Luminoso grow.

¹⁷⁷ The University was founded by the archbishop Don Cristóbal de Castilla y Zamora in 1677 and closed in 1886. Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga, “Reseña,” <http://www.unsch.edu.pe/portal/la-universidad/resena-historca.html>.

¹⁷⁸ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 54–5.

¹⁷⁹ Orin Starn, “Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru–Shining Path and the Refusal of History,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27, no. 2 (May 1995), 404.

¹⁸⁰ This name was taken “from the maxim of the founder of Peru’s first communist party, José Carlos Mariátegui: ‘*El Marxismo-Leninismo abrirá el sendero luminoso hacia la revolución*’ (‘Marxism-Leninism will open the shining path to revolution’). Encyclopaedia Britannica, s. v. “Shining Path,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/540794/Shining-Path>.

¹⁸¹ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 55.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Starn, “Maoism in the Andes,” 404. Guzmán’s famous ability to persuade—or brainwash—granted him the nickname of *Dr. Shampú* (Dr. Shampoo).

On March 17, 1980, Guzmán started a sequence of covert meetings in Ayacucho—the Central Committee’s second plenary—that consolidated the overall guidance for the group to get out of the shadows and cross “the irreversible step over the threshold.”¹⁸⁷ This happened exactly two months later, with the burning of “ballot boxes on the eve of the Presidential elections, in the town of Chuschi, Ayacucho.”¹⁸⁸ After a series of successful attacks in the first three years of action, the initial 300 members of Sendero Luminoso increased about tenfold.¹⁸⁹

From 1983 to 1992, the group expanded its area of operations and support bases, making its presence known in 114 provinces of the 195 that exist in the country.¹⁹⁰ This was also the time when the group made its first indiscriminate use of terrorism by killing 69 peasants with the purpose of “‘exemplary punishment’ because they [local people] rebelled against this organization [Sendero Luminoso] and helped government forces in the fight against subversion;”¹⁹¹ this was an episode that came to be known as the Lucanamarca Massacre.

Sendero made vast use of terrorism to disseminate fear across Peru. For instance, individuals who refused to cooperate were put through notorious “people’s trials.” According to an Ayacucho Catholic priest, in some of these judgments “peasants were stripped and tied to a post in the center of the village, while the villagers, including women and children, were forced to cut a piece of flesh from the victim. This torture

¹⁸⁵ Some Sendero Luminoso members thought Guzmán was one of their promised gods who had returned to fulfill the ancient prophecies. Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 58.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 55.

¹⁸⁷ Gustavo G. Ellenbogen, *Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 21.

¹⁸⁸ Executive Intelligence Review, “Shining Path: Core of the RIM Project,” November 17, 1995, http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2246_sendero.html.

¹⁸⁹ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 56.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 62.

¹⁹¹ Peru, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, “La Masacre de Lucanamarca (1983),” trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba, August 2003, 44.

would continue until the victim died from blood loss or shock.”¹⁹² Terrorism was also used for recruitment purposes: “One method of recruitment by fear occurred when parents were murdered in front of their children, who were then forced to eat their parents’ tongues.”¹⁹³

On September 12, 1992, Guzmán and two other leaders of the Sendero Luminoso were captured in Lima by DINCOTE agents—*Dirección Nacional Contra el Terrorismo* or National Direction against Terrorism—together with many archives of the party.¹⁹⁴ This event became a watershed in the organization’s history. According to Hunefeldt, “Although domestic terrorist activities did not completely subside after this, the country suffered much less from terrorist attacks and the fears they inspired.”¹⁹⁵ One and a half years later, more than 3,500 Sendero Luminoso members were captured.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, when Guzmán appeared on television calling on his followers for negotiation and peace talks with the government at the end of 1993, Sendero Luminoso later split into two factions: the “*Acuerdistas*” (the ones who followed Guzmán) and the “*Proseguir*,” who decided to continue with the armed struggle.¹⁹⁷

Although the *Proseguir* faction of Sendero Luminoso is still in operation, the group has never fully recovered from the “decapitation” of its main leading light, Guzmán. Óscar Ramírez Durand—Comrade Feliciano, the last free member of the Central Committee—who emerged as the new leader of the group after Guzmán’s arrest, was also captured by Peruvian Commandos in 1999.¹⁹⁸ In 2012, Florindo Eleuterio

¹⁹² U. S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *The Shining Path After Guzman: The Threat and the International Response*, quoted in Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 61.

¹⁹³ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 68.

¹⁹⁴ The investigations that led to Guzmán’s capture were “based on the discovery of medicine for psoriasis, from which Guzman was known to suffer, cigarette stubs from Guzman’s favorite brand, and chicken bones (Guzman enjoyed Peruvian roast chicken).” Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 73.

¹⁹⁵ Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru*, 258.

¹⁹⁶ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 73.

¹⁹⁷ Esteban Valle-Riestra, “¿Es el MOVADef el brazo legal de Sendero Luminoso?,” *La Colmena*, May 20, 2012, <http://lacolmena.pe/es-el-movadef-el-brazo-legal-de-sendero-luminoso/>.

¹⁹⁸ CNN.com, “Shining Path Leader Taken Without a Shot,” July 14, 1999, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9907/14/peru.path.02/index.html?iref=newssearch>.

Flores Hala—Comrade Artemio—was captured in the Peruvian jungle near Puerto Pizana, which resulted in the collapse of the faction located in the northern part of Peru.¹⁹⁹ But some factions that operate in the VRAEM²⁰⁰ (Valle del Río Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro; or Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley) are still active.²⁰¹

C. PROMPTERS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO'S WILL TO FIGHT

As all open systems, Sendero Luminoso is under constant influence from external environmental factors. Guzmán's arrest in 1992 and his decision to negotiate with the government the following year bewildered the organization and led to a split between those who believed they were wrong—the *arrepentidos* or repented—and those who wanted to keep fighting—the *proseguir*, or "Go On." This defining moment suggests the drawing of a line separating Sendero's will to fight before and after 1993.

1. From 1970 to 1993

Although there is no consensus among specialists on the reasons that drove the members of the Sendero Luminoso to employ violence to overthrow the state, it is possible to identify the least controversial ones. Andrea Portugal, citing Macera, states that the root causes were due to:

the persistence of the colonial order. . . daily abuse against the Andean world had been lived as a reproduction of conquest and domination up to and including the present day, engendering and accumulating resentment and hatred for centuries, which had translated into a desire to harm the exploiter and everything that he represented, but also in a hope for radical change.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ The Guardian, "Peruvian Troops Capture Shining Path Leader," February 13, 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/13/peruvian-troops-capture-shining-path-leader>.

²⁰⁰ The VRAEM encompasses five provinces from four departments: Ayacucho, Apurímac, Cuzco, and Huancavelica in an area of about 41,000 km², where more than 500,000 people live in extreme poverty. There are 345 Amerindian communities from the Machiguenga, Ashaninka, and Nomatsiguenga ethnic groups living in the area. José C. Cabrera, "Organización del CCFFAA," trans. Paulo E. Santa Barba (lecture, Escuela Superior de Guerra del Perú – Escuela de Postgrado, Lima, 2012).

²⁰¹ Katie Micklethwaite, "The Shining Path: Battered, but Unbroken," *Americas Quarterly*, September 5, 2013, <http://americasquarterly.org/content/shining-path-battered-but-unbroken>.

²⁰² Andrea Portugal, *Voices from the War: Exploring the Motivation of Sendero Luminoso Militants* (University of Oxford, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), 2008), 6.

In other words, their will to fight was related to a desire for revenge brought on by a perceived injustice—exploitation and exclusion—that started right after the Spanish conquest.

For Degregori, Senderistas' willpower came from the belief in an ideology, because, even though Degregori denies "the possibility of teachers, young students and peasants sharing a common horizon of ideas, feelings and motives,"²⁰³ he acknowledges that what all of them wanted mostly was social order, something that could only be delivered by Marxism-Leninism.

Galindo states that Sendero's will to fight was related to religious beliefs. He claims that Christianity influenced the Amerindians to create "'the Andean utopia', which idealized the Inca Empire as a regime of justice and wealth and created an expectation of re-establishing this glorious past. As with Christian notions of the Final Judgment and the return of Christ, this new order would only be possible after a period of chaos and total destruction led by a messiah."²⁰⁴ For many, Guzmán was the promised one.²⁰⁵

Portugal states that, for Portocarrero, the belief in Marxist ideology and religion, the desire for revenge against historical oppression, and joy were the originators of Senderistas' will to fight.²⁰⁶ She also highlights that, for Henríquez, their willpower came from the ideological belief in Marxism-Leninism as the cure for their psychosocial and economic problems and the desire for revenge their perception of "exclusion and injustice."²⁰⁷

For Portugal, who researched on testimonies of imprisoned Senderistas collected by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission - CVR),²⁰⁸ the initiators of Senderistas' will to fight can be traced to the desire for revenge

²⁰³ Ibid., 9.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 10.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 11.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ It is important to mention that not all individuals studied in Andrea Portugal's research were identified as members of the Sendero Luminoso.

against perceived social injustices—class discrimination and oppression that led to lack of opportunities and extreme poverty to the highlanders. Furthermore, Senderistas responded to the initial government overreaction, the belief in the Marxist-Leninist ideology as the only way to solve their difficulties, and the cult of Guzmán.²⁰⁹

Buikema and Burger state that the organization was able to combine “Maoism with ‘Andean millennialism’, suggesting the perceived golden era of the Incan reign.”²¹⁰ The belief in Guzmán was similar to a cult. The Senderistas believed he “was shrouded in mystery, a charismatic, almost hypnotic leader, who held the one true vision of the future and the means to achieve it. In their minds, he was almost superhuman and his commands were obeyed without question or hesitation.”²¹¹ They also point out “notions of injustice, racial resentment, economic disparity . . . a sense of government neglect by highland mestizos and Indians tied to racial inequalities”²¹² that could only be solved by the recreation of a new Marxist-Leninist government as the motivations of the organization’s will to fight.

Based on the previously mentioned description and on what was exposed in Chapter III, it is logical to conclude that the most important sources of Sendero Luminoso’s will to fight during this period were due to religious and ideological beliefs, the desire to avenge historical oppression and exclusion, and the search for economic satisfaction, especially escape extreme poverty (see Figure 4).

²⁰⁹ Portugal, *Voices from the War*, 27–39.

²¹⁰ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 55.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 58.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 65.




Figure 4. Main sources of Sendero's will to fight from 1970 to 1993.

2. From 1994 to the Present

The arrest of Guzmán was a hard shock to an organization whose members believed he was the Promised One. His call for peace negotiations with the government only made things worse, a fact that resulted in a loss of the will to fight in many of those who used to believe in him. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the belief in Guzmán was once important but is no longer an important source of the will to fight of Senderistas. Since they are still active, there must be other reasons that impel them to employ violence against the government.

According to Portugal, *Proseguir* members still believe in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology as the only way to solve the problems of the country. She states that imprisoned members say that “as long as injustices and poverty exist, problems will not be solved . . . children will grow up with resentment . . . [and] rise up again.”²¹³

Furthermore, according to the Peruvian government, current day Senderistas:

Though *not entirely without ideological motivation*, [emphasis added] the VRAE faction has explicitly abandoned Guzman's teachings and is deeply involved with coca base production and sale to international drug traffickers primarily from Colombia. . . . [With] its increased focus on

²¹³ Portugal, *Voices from the War*, 63.

drug trafficking, the group no longer focuses its efforts on instigating political change in Peru. Instead, the VRAE faction's main concern is protecting its lucrative drug processing and smuggling activities from government interference.²¹⁴

The Peruvian Armed Forces also acknowledge that the Senderistas “are not only Sicarii, [they are] watchmen, narco trafficking businessmen, and participants of other illicit activities,”²¹⁵ and they still have not lost their Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology and political objectives. They also do not recognize Guzmán as their leader.²¹⁶

The magazine *Diálogo* claimed the following about Sendero Luminoso in 2012: “With no ideological leadership, the group became more militant and turned to drug trafficking, resembling the Colombian guerrilla organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).”²¹⁷ Similarly, Geoffrey Ramsey claims that “the VRAE Shining Path have had a reputation as being less politically motivated . . . and more involved in the drug trade.”²¹⁸ In other words, Sendero's motivation is now primarily financial. Such assertions are controversial, particularly because the group may have returned to the initial phase of its Maoist campaign, making use of illicit activities to acquire funds and rebuild itself. Nevertheless, greed is still a strong motivation of human behavior, particularly for those closely managing the money.

An important point that must be mentioned is the fact that not too much has structurally changed in the VRAEM region of the country since the inception of Sendero Luminoso. According to Portugal, although the situation in the highlands is not as bad as when Sendero Luminoso started its campaign,

Peru is a country with high levels of poverty and profound inequalities. . . . Poverty and extreme poverty are much higher in rural areas, at 72.5 and 40.3 per cent, respectively. The capital city of Lima lies in the coast and is

²¹⁴ Embassy of Peru in Washington, DC, “Peru Targets the Remnants of the Shining Path,” May 3, 2012, <http://www.embassyofperu.org/peru-targets-the-remnants-of-shining-path/>.

²¹⁵ Cabrera, “Organización del CCFFAA.”

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ *Diálogo*, “Old Enemy, New Strategy,” vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2012), 52.

²¹⁸ Geoffrey Ramsey, “Shining Path Hold Political Rally in Rural Peru,” *Sight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas*, August 15, 2012, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/shining-path-political-vrae>.

the centre of economic growth, while the *Sierra* [Mountains]—once the prosperous empire of the Incas—and the *Selva* [Jungle] constitute the poorest regions of the country, with levels of poverty around 80 per cent . . .²¹⁹

The government also recognizes that there are still many problems in the inlands and highlands of the country. For instance, in the VRAEM region, while half of the people live in poverty conditions, the other half subsists in conditions of extreme poverty; in other words, virtually all of the people struggle with day-to-day living. Furthermore, the state is absent or fails to provide services in key areas. For example, there is a lack of basic infrastructure services, such as healthcare, education, and communication and transportation systems, more than 40% of children suffer from malnutrition, and the most important available sources of finance come from agriculture, particularly the cultivation of cocaine.²²⁰ There are still lots of grievances related to the feeling of exclusion and abandonment by the state that are subject to Sendero's manipulation.

In short, the central prompters of Sendero Luminoso's will to fight at the present time (see Figure 5) appear to be based on an ideological belief (Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) and a search for economic improvement (escape extreme poverty and greed).




Figure 5. Main sources of Sendero's will to fight from 1994 to the present day.

²¹⁹ Portugal, *Voices from the War*, 28.

²²⁰ Cabrera, "Organización del CCFFAA."

D. THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO SENDERO LUMINOSO'S WILL TO FIGHT

Based on the model proposed in Chapter III, if the Peruvian government wanted to diminish (w), it should have devised measures aimed to decrease the existing values of (b), (r), and (s) at time (t) while simultaneously employing actions against (m) that would not have created second or third order effects that would increase (w). Hence, from 1980 to 1993 (t), the government should have tried to diminish the cult of Guzmán and the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideology (b), government oppression (r), and improve financial life – escape poverty (s). From 1994 to the present day (t), it should have worked to reduce the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism ideology (b) and improve financial life – escape poverty and greed (s).

When Sendero Luminoso launched its campaign in May 1980, it did not receive much attention.²²¹ The government initially assumed that the organization was not an actual menace to the country, so the decision made was to employ special police units, known as Sinchis, to deal with the law-enforcement problem.²²² The Sinchis were not suited to the task and their indiscriminating use of violence worked for the Senderistas, who saw their membership grow with many people seeking revenge against these government forces.²²³ Moreover, the group's initial success influenced their will to fight in a positive way. As a result, the government's answer to the problem only made the value of (r) grow.

In 1983, similar to what initially happened to Brazil in the Araguaia region and Colombia in Marquetalia, the government decided to employ massive numbers of conventional military forces to fight against Sendero Luminoso. The troops overreacted not only against the very small number of Senderistas they found, but mostly against the local population, who then was not only terrorized by the Sendero Luminoso, but also by the military. "Thousands of civilians were killed, tortured, kidnapped, or simply

²²¹ Ellenbogen, *The Shining Path*, 18.

²²² Buikema and Burger, "Sendero Luminoso," 69.

²²³ Ibid.

disappeared (*las desapariciones*) during the conflict.”²²⁴ Once again, the desire for revenge sprouted in many, sparking their will to fight. Thus, this approach only contributed to increase (*r*) values.

At this point, it is important to highlight that the discrepancies between the populations who lived in the cities and the ones in the countryside were not only real, but were also not sensed by the citizens dwelling in the capital. According to Buikema and Burger, “For Peruvians living in Lima and other urban areas, the lesson learned related to how different the lives of native Indians in the Andes were from their own. Many spoke of ‘the two Perus.’”²²⁵ This assertion confirms that the government’s actions did not undermine Sendero’s belief in Marxism-Leninism as the only way to overcome the status quo, but in fact reinforced it.

In 1986, following a mutiny in three prisons in Lima, “the army entered the jails and slaughtered inmates, even after the terrorists had surrendered”²²⁶ and added more fuel to the group’s desire for revenge. Moreover, such actions mostly worked for the Senderistas, who were winning the battle of the narrative; people in Lima started to believe the government was doing exactly as described by Sendero’s discourse. By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, their will to fight was probably at its peak. As it had done before, the government’s response only increased the values of (*r*).

Interestingly, in the late 1980s the Peruvian government began to shift its strategy against Sendero. The state discharged thousands of corrupt officials, initiated select operations with a discriminate use of force, and established an efficient network of human intelligence, “while touting the economic and security improvements that the government had been implementing.”²²⁷ This counter-narrative campaign was conducted at the same time Sendero was shifting its focus from the countryside to the cities. At this

²²⁴ Ibid., 70.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru*, 242.

²²⁷ Buikema and Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” 70.

point, government actions began to be consistent with its discourse.²²⁸ At least during this phase, government actions did not increase (*r*) values.

The turning point of Sendero Luminoso's will to fight was Guzmán's arrest in 1992. Guzmán, the messiah who used to consider "himself a superior being, comparable to a semi-god,"²²⁹ suddenly became an ordinary man not only to his followers, but also to himself. Moreover, when he cried out to the Senderistas to accept an agreement with the government, many considered him a traitor,²³⁰ something unacceptable for a comrade, much less for a living god. Many members who worshipped him joined the *arrepentidos* and decided to leave the group, as often happens when cult leaders cannot deliver on their promises. At the same time, it must be highlighted that the data obtained in Guzmán's arrest led to the "capture of 3,600 SL [Sendero Luminoso] insurgents in the following 18 months."²³¹ This government action put an end to the cult of Guzmán (*b*) and, for the most part, the desire for revenge (*r*). Nevertheless, the smallest component of *b* (*Marxism-Leninism-Maoism*) and (*s*) were not broken.

The group's will to fight seems to have increasingly and rapidly diminished from 1992 to 1993. From 1994 to 2004 it remained low, but not to a point below the critical level where terrorism does not occur. In the words of Gordon McCormick, the Peruvian government has achieved a strong win, but it did not follow on with measures that could definitely end the problem.²³² After 2004, the group's will to fight appears to have been slowly and gradually increasing (see Figure 6 later in this chapter). The group's motivation also seems to have changed: the small and precise operations of the Peruvian commandos have not sparked the appearance of (*r*) anymore; (*b*) is related to Marxist-Leninist ideology; and (*s*) is not only due to the desire to escape poverty, but also to greed.

²²⁸ Many of these measures were due to the influence of the United States support that began in 1988.

²²⁹ Portugal, *Voices from the War*, 17.

²³⁰ Ibid., 18.

²³¹ Buikema and Burger, "Sendero Luminoso," 73.

²³² Gordon H. McCormick, "The Complete Win," in *Gangs and Guerrillas: Ideas for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism*, eds. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein (Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 3.

It seems that the Peruvian government still believes that a “decapitation” strategy will be the solution for Sendero Luminoso, as it seemed to be the case when Guzmán was captured. The arrests of subsequent leaders suggest that this is what is actually happening: in 1999 Feliciano was the target; in 2012, it was Artemio. Last September was Gabriel’s and Alipio’s turn.²³³ Nevertheless, Sendero Luminoso is still active and its membership is estimated at 500 people.²³⁴ Although the Peruvian government publicized its concern with the VRAEM problems,²³⁵ in reality the problem is still being treated as a military one. The only institutions that truly direct their efforts to the region are the Armed Forces; the other instruments of statecraft do not fully participate,²³⁶ either because officials do not want to work in the area or due to a lack of interest.

In summation, there is still no holistic approach to deal with Sendero. The inconsistency between the government’s message and government’s actions will never lead to what McCormick calls a complete victory: “A *complete win*, finally, involves not only pushing the enemy across his breakpoint and gaining control over one’s political environment, but resolving the underlying social and political factors that gave rise to an organized opposition in the first place. A player wins, in this case, by eliminating his adversary’s *motivation* to resist.”²³⁷ Similarly, in the words of Max Manwaring:

If the Peruvian government does not deliver meaningful political, economic and social change and reform to its people, and if the Peruvian people cannot see Abimael Guzman’s Leninist concept of “true democracy” for what it really is, then demagogues, populists, warlords,

²³³ Katie Micklethwaite, “The Shining Path: Battered, but Unbroken,” *Americas Quarterly*, September 5, 2013, <http://americasquarterly.org/content/shining-path-battered-but-unbroken>.

²³⁴ Yasmin Calmet and Diego Salazar, “VRAEM: Políticas de Seguridad Pública en Zona de Conflicto,” *7th Latin-American Congress of Political Sciences – ALACIP*, Bogotá, September 25–27, 2013, http://www.academia.edu/4690597/Vraem_Políticas_de_Seguridad_Publica_en_zona_de_conflicto.

²³⁵ Peru released the Plan Estratégico Integral Territorial VRAEM 2013–2016 (Territorial Comprehensive Strategic Plan) establishing many directives to solve the structural problems of the region and integrate the area to the rest of the country. The area is receiving government attention since the implementation of Plan VRAE in 2006.

²³⁶ Calmet and Salazar, “VRAEM: Políticas de Seguridad Pública en Zona de Conflicto.”

²³⁷ McCormick, “The Complete Win,” 3.

drug lords, criminals and regional insurgent organizations like the Shining Path will sooner or later compete for control of the failing state.²³⁸




Figure 6. Sendero Luminoso's will to fight over time.

This chapter presented Peru's historical problems and how Sendero Luminoso skillfully used these grievances to create its narrative to spark the group's will to fight. The group's will was strengthened by government actions, which fed their ideology and desire for revenge, and only began to decrease with a change in military strategy to one that positively engaged the population and helped lead to the capture of Guzmán. Despite this progress, the government has not achieved a complete win and the group persists today. The next chapter will offer concluding thoughts based on this discussion and recommendations for states to mitigate terrorists' will to fight.

²³⁸ Max G. Manwaring, "The Resurgence of Peru's Shining Path," *World Politics Review*, February 22, 2011, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7959/the-resurgence-of-perus-shining-path>.

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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare, it
is because we do not dare that things are difficult.

—Seneca

This thesis set out to explore terrorists' will to fight and the variables that affect that willpower. The theoretical literature on terrorism does not directly address the subject, creating a critical gap in the conditions that allow terrorism to flourish and possible counterterrorism strategies. The study of the will to fight has been understudied most likely because it is a blurry and a difficult concept to measure, not to mention that the results found will also reflect some degree of subjectivity. Moreover, an approach that focuses on attacking the root causes of the problem is controversial, because these strategies take time and the outcomes will most likely be realized only in the long run.

Despite all these difficulties, this thesis sought to answer the following questions: *What gives terrorists the will to fight? Can this will be eroded and will this result in a reduction of terrorism?*

In order to answer these questions, this thesis built upon Clausewitz's maxim that one's power of resistance is the product of one's means times the strength of his will²³⁹ and started with the prime assumption that terrorists' power of resistance is a product of terrorists' resources times the strength of their will to fight. Drawing on Bertalanffy's theory of open systems, this thesis proposed critical variables and a causal statement for the conditions under which terrorists' will to fight is created. Then it used the Sendero Luminoso as a case study to test the theory's explanatory power for the will to fight.

The theoretical findings suggest that the will to fight is a function of a *belief* in a cause, be it a religion, an ideology, ethnicity, or values; a desire for *revenge*; a search for *satisfaction* (renown, joy, or financial incentives), and *culture*. Beliefs, revenge, and satisfaction are the generators of the will to fight while culture is a variable that influences the susceptibility of an individual, a group, or a network to resort to violence

²³⁹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 16.

under certain conditions. Consequently, to diminish terrorists' will to fight it is necessary to decrease the values of these variables in the equation.

This thesis used the variables in the proposed causal argument in Chapter III to test the rise and fall of the Sendero Luminoso over a period of three decades. This investigation found that Sendero's will to fight suffered substantial changes in this period. From the group's inception until the capture of Guzmán in 1993, Sendero's willpower was based on religious and ideological beliefs, the desire for revenge, and the search for economic satisfaction, particularly the escape from extreme poverty. From 1994 to the present day, the drivers of the group's will to fight became the belief in an ideology and the search for economic satisfaction (the escape from extreme poverty and greed). These findings suggest that religious beliefs and the desire for revenge were the most important prompters of Sendero's will to fight, as their reduction almost put an end to the group.

Due to the fact that every action or inaction taken by the state or terrorists may have an impact on terrorists' will to fight, the examination of terrorism requires holistic thinking. The undiscerning use of force in terrorism can be as productive as cutting off one of hydra's heads. For instance, in the Peruvian case, the initial indiscriminate use of violence by government forces increased Sendero Luminoso's desire for revenge, while Sendero's first accomplishments contributed to increasing the group's will to fight by reinforcing Sendero's beliefs.

The will to fight can be worn down, a fact that will certainly result in a decline of terrorism. Nevertheless, decreasing the value of only some of the variables of the will to fight may not be enough to adequately tackle the problem. The capture of Guzmán certainly put an end to Sendero's belief in him as the Promised One. Furthermore, the judicious use of violence by government forces reduced Sendero's desire for revenge, actions that significantly mitigated terrorism in the subsequent years. Nevertheless, the Peruvian State failed to take measures to diminish Sendero's belief in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Sendero's search for satisfaction (especially to escape poverty). In military terms, the government failed to exploit its initial success and push the values of the will to fight below the critical level.

As occurs with all open systems, terrorists' will to fight may significantly change over time. This fact forces the state to continually recalibrate its assessment of the drivers of terrorists' willpower, as well as of the second and third order effects of its overall actions. In the case of Peru, the government failed to perceive that Sendero Luminoso's will to fight was further influenced by the appearance of a new variable in the equation: greed. The emergence of terrorism as a means of gaining wealth, particularly through the drug trade, required the government to adapt to this new context; ultimately, it did not and Sendero has persisted.

In summation, this thesis recommends the following approaches for governments to take to mitigate terrorists' will to fight.

First, it is important to try to understand what the problem really is, always keeping in mind that each case of terrorism is unique; there is no "one size fits all" solution. Then, the identification of key variables and their level of influence in the equation of terrorists' power of resistance are the next issues that need to be addressed. Once the variables of the will to fight have been identified, an adequate approach to deal with the situation can be designed.

Second, as terrorism requires the existence of critical levels of will to fight and sufficient resources, a good strategy should address both factors simultaneously. A decline in the will to fight needs to be accompanied by reductions in terrorists' means. A successful strategy needs to provide mechanisms of defense against current threats, envision the mitigation of terrorism to tolerable levels, and avert the creation of future problems. Therefore, the main focus of a counterterrorism strategy needs to be on weakening the will to fight, not just on diminishing the means—as the traditional strategy does—particularly because states are neither ubiquitous nor omnipotent and terrorism is cheap. As Creveld argues, "The logic of strategy itself requires that the opponent's motives be understood, since on this rests any prospect of success in war."²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, 217.

Third, it is very important that all instruments of statecraft work in harmony and cooperate for such a strategy to work satisfactorily, because terrorism is a problem that concerns all instruments of statecraft, not only military power. In fact, some of the drivers of the will to fight can only be lessened by non-military departments or ministries, especially when some grievances against the state may be legitimate, such as lack of public services or access to resources of the state. This was true with Sendero's followers. As Zachary Shore states, "Striking that balance between diplomacy and force is one of the keys to prudent statecraft."²⁴¹

Fourth, it is crucial for the state to adapt its strategy in response to significant changes as fast as it can. Since terrorism is at least a two-player game, the outcomes of every government's and enemy's actions need to be constantly evaluated, so corrections can be made in a timely fashion. The enemy reacts the way he wants to, not necessarily the way the state expects him to. Furthermore, time works mainly against the state, particularly for the ones not fighting on their own soil. As pointed out by Henry Kissinger, "The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose."²⁴²

The fact that the state's machine is not, by design, structured to adapt quickly imposes a problem for successful counterterrorism strategies. In the case of the military, the most resilient and capable tool of rapidly adjusting to changing situations is its special operations forces. Accordingly, such elements, in conjunction with intelligence assets and other selected instruments of statecraft, should be the primary military forces to be used in a good counterterrorism strategy. As pointed out by Sun Tzu, "One must adapt oneself to the enemy's changing posture as naturally and as effortlessly as flowing water winding down a hillside . . ."²⁴³

²⁴¹ Zachary Shore, *Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008), 27.

²⁴² Henry A. Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, no. 48/2 (January 1969), 214, quoted in Beatrice Hauser, "Introduction," in Clausewitz, *On War*, xxvii.

²⁴³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, ed. and trans. Roger T. Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), 58.

Fifth, states should stay consistent across time in order to establish trust with the population, even though this may be quite difficult for democracies. Sudden changes of strategy may generate confusion among and inside instruments of statecraft as well as with the population. Moreover, a state's actions need also to be consistent with its discourse; a state cannot preach one thing and do another or fail to fulfill its commitments. Such postures do not contribute to the effort of mitigating terrorists' will to fight; to the contrary, this may only reinforce terrorists' narratives.

Lastly, it is very important not to overreact in the face of a terrorist attack. The indiscriminate and excessive use of violence by the state will strengthen terrorists' desire for revenge and hence increase their will to fight. Such an obvious observation may seem unnecessary; nevertheless, this type of conduct is a very common mistake committed by states in fighting terrorism, particularly in the early stages. In line with Sun Tzu, it is important to remember that "supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting,"²⁴⁴ even if the wounds cry out for a hasty and massive retaliation.

This study is only a first step. Analyses of other groups' will to fight need to be done in order to see if the model adequately works. The findings of this thesis suggest areas for future study that may include distinct analysis of each variable of the will to fight, questions that require the examination of a great number of case studies. For instance, religious beliefs seem to be very strong drivers of the will to fight and so do ideological beliefs against "invaders." In regard to these drivers of terrorism, the following questions can be examined: What should a good approach to decreasing values of religious beliefs look like? What is the role of ideological beliefs in terrorists' will to fight? How can ethnical beliefs be tackled? What is the importance of terrorists' narratives for their will to fight? Is it better to counter their narratives or to let them fade over time?

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 46.

This thesis does not have the ambition of solving the problem of terrorism. The results found are intended to assist decision makers in developing strategies that may contribute to moving states that face the problem as close as possible to McCormick's "complete win," something that cannot be achieved without breaking terrorists' will to fight.

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